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Abstract 
 
During the past 15 years competitive tenders have become a common procedure to procure and 
organise passenger railway services in European Union member countries. Different models have been 
developed in different countries, spanning from the British radical privatisation and franchising of the 
railway services to the more incremental processes in countries like Sweden, the Netherlands and 
Germany. The variety of tendering models has occurred for a number of reasons. For example, EU 
legislation permits different models of organising tenders, member countries have had different goals 
with the introduction of tenders and other reforms, and within countries we find trial-and-error processes 
aiming at reducing earlier flaws. In this article we will describe the dominating tendering procedures, look 
into their theoretical rationale and discuss their possible pitfalls and advantages, drawing from the 
experiences of several countries. It is evident that the different tendering regimes suffer from different 
types of problems. In the Swedish tenders there have often been very few competing firms, in Britain the 
long time span of the first round of franchised contracts resulted in difficulties in making correct 
estimates of future developments etc. The article concludes with an overall appraisal of the different 
models and explores the possibilities for learning across the tendering regimes. 
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Introduction 
The process of “Europeanisation”, the creation of European institutions and markets, 
of the former national economies in Europe, has increasingly affected the competition 
policy in the union’s member states (see e.g. Vickers, 2001, Morgan, 2001, and Dabbah, 
2003). Public procurement by competitive tendering is an important part of these 
policies. It is supposed to increase competition, save taxpayers’ money and safeguard 
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equal treatment for competing firms, regardless of nationality (European Commission 
1996). The European transportation industry, not least the railway sector, has been 
particularly affected by this development, implying important structural changes in 
several countries. The European Directive 91/440 on the separation of accounts for 
infrastructure from operations has commonly functioned as a starting point for railway 
reforms, although specific problems and events at the national level have also played an 
important role. An overview and interpretation of how far rail liberalisation has 
progressed in the countries of the European Union is provided in reports of the so-called 
rail liberalisation index (Kirchner, 2004). 
This article begins with a broad look at some of the theories related to the introduction 
of regulatory reforms such as tendering in the railway sector. We then turn to the 
evolution of railway policies at the European Union (EU) level, followed by a closer 
look at the development in four EU member states: Sweden, Great Britain, Germany 
and the Netherlands. For each country, we look into the rationale and reasons behind the 
reforms, the process and history of the reforms, and the structure of the reforms (vertical 
and/or horizontal disintegration, use of tendering and contracts, types of contracts and 
their lengths etc). We also consider the experience in terms of the number of bidders, 
new entry, transparency, positive effects and particular problems, and how problems 
have been solved. In an analysing section we make an overall appraisal of the different 
models and explore the possibilities for learning across the tendering regimes. The 
paper ends with our conclusions and a look at possible ways forward. 
 
 
Theoretical approaches to railway reforms 
 
Theories on public and private ownership and PPP 
 
Privatisation refers to the transfer of public ownership and management to the private 
sector. Since privatisations are often the effect of a market transition that originates in a 
deregulation, the words deregulation and privatisation are sometimes mistakenly used as 
synonyms. According to Vickers and Yarrow (1991) privatisation of former public 
enterprises and services can take three forms: 
1. Privatisation of competitive firms – the transfer to the private sector of state-owned 
enterprises operating in competitive markets. 
2. Privatisation of monopolies – transfer to the private sector of state-owned 
enterprises with substantial market power. These firms can either be natural monopolies 
(like electricity transmission) or “artificial” monopolies, where competition from 
foreign or domestic firms could exist. 
3. Contracting out of publicly financed services, previously performed by public 
sector organisations. 
The economic motives for privatising a public monopoly compared to replacing a 
public monopoly with competition are quite different. There is a widespread agreement 
that the replacement of a public or publicly guaranteed private monopoly with 
competition between competing firms results in improved efficiency. The efficiency 
gains are less clear for the transfer of a public monopoly to private ownership. In this 
case, it seems that the regulatory policy is crucial for preventing negative effects of 
monopoly power (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991; Alexandersson et al, 1998). One must 
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also consider the distinction between productive and allocative efficiency. Competition 
generally fosters gains in productive efficiency, for example through increased labour 
productivity, while a transition to a state of better allocation of resources and optimum 
output may be less straightforward and take longer time (see e.g. Preston, 1996). 
Some monopolised markets may be better suited to the introduction of competition for 
the market (for example by means of tendering), rather than competition in the market. 
In theory, this is advantageous when some resources of production are fixed or 
otherwise limited in terms of capacity, making them difficult to be used by more than 
one firm at a time (for example a time slot in a railway time table), when there is a need 
for coordinated planning of production in order to make use of network effects, and 
when many competing companies would create a fragmentised and possibly irregular 
supply over time – making it difficult for consumers to get the necessary information. 
The special circumstances related to contracting out and the selection of a winning bid 
entail some specific problems that are rarely observed on ordinary markets. The 
procuring entity has a strong position as a buyer, sometimes close to a monopsonist. It 
determines the range and limits of the actual market. A supplier that wins a tendered 
contract enjoys a monopoly-like position during the contract period, but its actual 
powers are often very restricted, e.g. in terms of its possibilities to influence prices and 
supply. The end consumers are bound to use the supplier chosen by the procuring entity. 
The contracting out of public passenger railway services may lead to a large variety of 
contracts, ranging from relatively simple and short-term management contracts to 
complex and long-term concession agreements. At a general level, they all imply the 
introduction of one form of public-private partnership. Public-private partnerships and 
their regulation is one of the recurring policy themes in the history of the transport 
industries (Estache and Serebrisky, 2004). In the European railway sector, tendered 
service contracts span from one to fifteen years, while the contracts of some Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) projects may run for 50 years and sometimes even longer. This 
means that actual competition between firms for a specific part of the market only takes 
place at discreet points in time, affecting the continuity of the seller structure, and 
thereby competition, over time. Even if other public tenders, concerning other parts of 
the market, may happen during these years, a loss in a tender that represents a major 
part in a firm’s business may lead to the dismantling of the firm altogether. It may be 
argued that firms that are efficient in the long run would always have the alternative to 
borrow money. However, this option does not seem to be realistic in situations when 
firms need to survive long periods of no or much reduced business activity, with only a 
chance (not certainty) to win a future tender. 
According to Bennett et al (1999) service contracts are generally the most competitive 
form of “privatisation”. They provide a relatively low risk option for expanding the role 
of the private sector, and the awarding procedure can help governments gain a more 
complete understanding of their infrastructure systems. Service contracts have potential 
to provide better system operation, allowing the government to obtain improvements in 
performance and efficiency through technology transfer and the acquisition of technical 
and/or managerial capacity. Since the contracts are reissued rather frequently, 
contractors should be under continuous pressure to keep costs low. Also, because 
service contracts are limited in scope, the barriers to entry should be fairly low. 
The disadvantages of service contracts are that they do not involve significant 
infusions of private capital, nor do they necessarily create a base from which to optimise 
entire infrastructure systems. In consequence, the contractor’s effectiveness in 
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improving the service performance is limited by the government’s ability to provide the 
necessary capital investments and direction. Another potential disadvantage is that 
service contracts leave the government in charge of many of the most explosive political 
issues and do little to separate the operator from political intervention. 
Long-term contracts like BOT projects can be an effective way to bring private 
money into the construction of new infrastructure facilities or into the substantial 
renewal of existing ones. BOT agreements tend to reduce market and credit risks for the 
private sector because the government is the only customer, reducing the risks 
associated with insufficient demand and ability to pay. Private actors will avoid BOT 
projects if the government is unwilling to provide assurances that the private sector 
investment will be paid back (Bennett et al, 1999). 
 
 
Scale economies, natural monopolies and contestable markets 
 
In the railway industry, presupposed scale economies in production, marketing, 
purchasing and co-ordination, for a long time implied that the provision of vertically 
integrated railway services was by definition viewed as a “natural” monopoly (see for 
example Beesley and Littlechild, 1992). Today, it is primarily the rail infrastructure that 
continues to be viewed as having characteristics of being a natural monopoly, forming 
the basis for vertical separation of infrastructure from operations as applied in several 
European countries. However, there is a persistent debate concerning the merits of 
vertical separation versus integration. Preston (1996) shows that the economic evidence 
for vertical separation is not entirely convincing. For example, there may be economies 
of scope related to vertically integrated planning of infrastructure and operations. It is 
possible that some scale economies in the European railway sector, which might have 
been possible to exploit before, are no longer available due to asset stripping and 
separation of previously integrated businesses and lines. Some researchers have 
therefore argued that vertical separation should never have been applied at all (see e.g. 
Bruzelius, 1998). 
In addition to the discussion on the pros and cons of vertical separation, there has also 
been a long-lived debate concerning the importance of various types of scale economies 
in railway operations. Empirical evidence from the U.S. suggests that there are constant 
returns to scale, but increasing returns to density in the railway sector. In other words, a 
railway company may only gain from running more trains on its existing network of 
lines, rather than both increasing the number of trains and expanding the network. 
Studies performed in Europe provide a more complex picture. According to Preston 
(1996), there are important economies of scale in network operation, but there is 
probably also an optimal size above which diseconomies set in. The smallest operators 
in Europe are affected by increasing returns to scale, the medium-sized operators 
experience constant returns and the largest appear to be affected by decreasing returns 
to scale. However, almost all railway companies, regardless of size, exhibit increasing 
returns to density (Preston, 1996). There are several possible sources to these 
economies, for example, increased amounts of services may lead to better use of 
terminal facilities, rolling stock and labour. But in the end, these economies may reach a 
point where they get exhausted and diseconomies of scale start to become apparent. 
This may be due to increased agency costs as companies become very large and 
possibly more difficult to manage and control. 
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It is important to note that this discussion on scale economies is limited to the effect 
of size upon variable costs. If demand-side complementarities are weighted in, such as 
co-ordinated timetables and marketing, the case for large railway companies probably 
gets stronger. However, very large firms may also have greater difficulties than small to 
respond quickly to shifts in customer needs. 
While most U.S. railroads are focussed on freight, European railways have 
traditionally been involved in both passenger and freight operations. This raises the 
question of economies of scope between passenger and freight operations. Although 
empirical findings are not entirely consistent, there is evidence of diseconomies of 
scope from studies on European as well as Japanese railways, suggesting that passenger 
and freight services may gain from being separated (Preston, 1996). 
The existence of scale economies in railway operations has sometimes been used to 
defend a regulatory framework that maintains a close-to-monopoly position of national 
operators in some European countries. But it has also been argued that scale economies 
are not automatically being advantageous to these operators. Rather, they need to be 
exploited, and firms may very well differ in their skills to do that. Large incumbents, 
lacking intra-modal competition for a very long time, may previously have experienced 
a rather limited pressure to rationalise their operations, especially if it was easy to get 
additional subsidies from the Government or other public authorities (Alexandersson et 
al, 2000). In theory, the introduction of a more open and competitive market should 
reveal the true economies of scale, enabling the most efficient firms to grow to their 
optimal size.  
To some extent related to the discussion on scale economies, we find an important 
theory development regarding how competition influences markets. With studies of the 
preconditions for when monopoly firms may actually be good for society, Baumol and 
other researchers came to formulate a theory on a new type of idealised market, the 
contestable market. Such a market is characterised by possibilities for easy and fast 
entry and exit of firms, which should all be affected by the same regulatory framework 
and have equal access to market knowledge and technology. Scale or scope economies 
may exist, but this is not a necessary condition. Sunk costs, rather than scale economies, 
make up the barrier to entry that gives a monopolist harmful power. The implications 
are that an industry may be efficient even in the case of a monopoly or oligopoly, 
provided that the threat from future competition is considered to be real. Regulations 
should therefore aim at facilitating entry and exit (Baumol et al, 1982). Shires et al 
(1994) have studied the British railway industry from a contestable market approach, 
finding some conditions to be fulfilled, but easy and fast entry and exit is still limited by 
several types of barriers, categorised as innocent, strategic or predatory. 
 
 
Transaction cost theory 
 
The costs to carry out transactions depend on the frequency of the transaction, 
uncertainty, the degree of specificity in the investments, and the perceived need to 
insure against opportunistic behaviour in markets with few actors. As can be understood 
from these factors, any change in a market structure may result in opposite forces as 
regards the transaction costs. A reduced uncertainty in the price level when using the 
market can be off-set by co-dependence between buyers and sellers if there is a high 
degree of investment specificity. 
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When the former railway monopolies were dismantled in countries like Great Britain 
and Sweden, transactions that used to be managed internally were moved to a market 
with sellers and buyers. This type of shift has been interpreted in two contrasting ways 
by researchers. One group claims that the horizontal and vertical disintegration resulted 
in lower transaction costs because the transactions were made visible and exposed to 
market mechanisms. One of the architects behind the privatisation of British Rail 
claimed that the separation of large vertically integrated firms into smaller specialised 
units lead to positive effects in terms of increased specialist knowledge of these firms 
(Foster, 1994). This division implied that a number of new contracts between the units 
had to be set up. Although the number of transactions in the system may have increased, 
the argument from this interpretation of transaction cost theory was that this does not 
necessarily imply higher transaction costs. In addition to the argument that transparency 
makes the transactions efficient, it has also been claimed that modern methods of 
management and control, auditing and computerisation decrease the costs of every 
transaction and make it easier to formulate the division of responsibility in contracts. 
Therefore, a clear separation of businesses into separate firms is necessary. 
It is important to note that one precondition of this line of reasoning is the exposure to 
market mechanisms, which is not always easy to achieve, and has even been forgotten 
in some regulatory reforms involving disintegration. When splitting large railway 
companies into smaller units, some of them may become monopoly firms (such as 
providers of railway stations). Moreover, it can be argued that learning and efficiency 
gains are also linked to having several customers with partly different needs. If the 
companies of the new system are only serving the very same divisions as before – and 
perhaps only one each – the gains from separation could turn out to be minor at best. 
Another potential concern is that if the monopoly is broken up into many sub-markets 
for inputs as well as for operations, the post-deregulation industry may contain so many 
firms in each market that transaction costs will inevitably increase. For example, the 
British railway industry was broken up into more than 80 firms. To reduce the potential 
risks associated with breaking up a monopoly one may consider to increase the size of 
the average tendered business operation and to construct upstream markets that are not 
so specialised – for example by merging different activities into one market.  
Some of those that oppose the idea of lowered transaction costs highlight the high 
asset specificity in the railway sector. They suggest that there is no such thing as an 
optimal way of organising competition in industries that have to rely on (monopoly) 
network facilities, and there is now a growing concern that the wrong design of the 
industry’s basic structural framework may have been chosen in the early days of the 
European regulatory reforms (Hultkrantz et al, 2005). One possible source for 
increasing transaction costs that may be more important than gains from competition is 
the misalignment of the mode of organisation. Misalignment refers to an arrangement in 
which the characteristics of the mode of organisation do not fit the attributes of the 
transaction it has to organise. This problem can occur in any new market constructed 
after the deregulation of a former monopoly (Yvrande-Billon and Ménard, 2005). 
 
 
Auction theory 
 
In a competitive tender in the European passenger railway market, a firm or a 
consortium may make promises about supplying a service at a defined quality level for 
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either a subsidy or against payment. Therefore, using competitive tendering when 
contracting out public services is similar to performing common value auctions with a 
sealed-bid procedure. However, the price of the bidders may not be the only factor 
(although often the most important) to take into account. The procuring public authority 
typically evaluates the competing bids regarding both price and quality once the bidding 
process has ended. Hence, competitive tenders combine traits, advantages, 
disadvantages and risks, of both auctions and beauty contests. Hultkrantz and Nilsson 
(2001) claim that a pure auction is better than a beauty contest because it offers a more 
market-oriented, objective and transparent method for awarding licences. Their 
strongest argument in favour of auctions is that firms in the auction process, by means 
of offering more and more money, reveal information about their estimation of the value 
of the good. Hultkrantz and Nilsson (2001) point out several disadvantages with beauty 
contests: 1) the process is slow and cumbersome, in particular if the final decision is 
challenged in court, 2) it is difficult to achieve transparency, and 3) many criteria are 
not objective or difficult to quantify. They further suggest that, even when social 
concerns are important, an auction is a better alternative since it can also include 
minimum requirements and can allow both positive bids in attractive regions and 
negative bids in unattractive regions. 
Auctions also present some notable risks and potential disadvantages. In many 
auctions, as well as in many competitive tenders, firms have made unrealistically 
optimistic forecasts about future revenues and costs. In auction theory, the concept of 
winner’s curse is used to explain why winning bids may be based upon judgmental 
failures. In particular, common value auctions – in which the participating bidders value 
items differently based upon their judgment of uncertain prospects – tend to be won by 
the bidder with the most optimistic estimate of the item’s value (see e.g. Kagel and 
Levin, 1986). Adnett (1998) discusses winner’s curse in relation to such tendering 
procedures. He argues that a low number of bidders, and in particular if they are 
inexperienced as in the first round of tendering in a certain business, will increase the 
importance of winner’s curse in competitive tenders. One way to limit the problem of 
winner’s curse is to alter the auctioning procedure. An open English auction, in which 
the bidders continuously follow the bids of their rivals, may stimulate aggressive 
bidding but yet decrease the risk of too optimistic bids and the related winner’s curse 
(Milgrom and Weber 1982). However, there is an increased risk of collusion in open 
auctions (see e.g. Robinson 1985). It should also be noted that winner’s curse in tenders 
of public services may also be related to the bidders’ attitude towards risk, for example 
their view of whether the government will be willing to bail them out or renegotiate the 
contract if they fail. 
 
 
The development of a common European Union railway policy 
 
The European Directive 91/440, on the separation of accounts for infrastructure from 
operations, was one of the earliest initiatives of the European Community regarding 
reforms in the railway sector. This directive has sometimes functioned as a starting 
point for railway reforms in the Community member states. In countries where 
tendering of railway services have been introduced, general EU directives on public 
procurement and European competition law have also played an important role. 
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Gradually, the European Union has developed a political agenda to promote the 
advancement of the railways. 
The current overall objectives of the European Union railway policy are (Lundström, 
2004; European Commission, 2001, 2002): 
1. Create a common market for railway transportation services. 
2. Achieve operational compatibility in order to overcome the different technical 
standards of the member states. 
3. Create a common market for railway material and equipment. 
4. Create equal conditions for competition between different modes of transportation. 
5. Support a sustainable development by means of stimulating modes of transportation 
that have less (negative) environmental impact (such as railway and sea transportation). 
In recent years, the European Commission has increased the efforts to make these 
goals more tangible, expressed by its work on several “railway packages”. The first 
railway package was accepted in 2001 following three years of negotiations. It included 
the decision to open up international freight services on a specified network of lines or 
corridors in 2008. Also, it would no longer suffice to separate infrastructure from 
operations only on the accounting level. The second railway package was agreed upon 
in the spring of 2004. In order to hurry on with liberalisation of the international freight 
services within EU, this part of the market was to be opened for entry on January 1, 
2006 (instead of 2008). In 2004, the European Commission also presented its proposal 
on a third railway package. An important part of this package is that the international 
passenger services within the European Union are to be opened up to competition no 
later than January 1, 2010. All companies that fulfil safety regulations and several other 
demands will then have open access to the railway infrastructure. This also includes the 
possibility of cabotage, i.e. that the market of one country is open for actors based in 
another member state. 
In parallel to the development of the railway packages, there has been a long on-
going process to reform the old Community regulation 1191/69, aiming at providing a 
coherent framework for when and how passenger services may be subsidised or given 
exclusive rights. The current regulation (latest revised in 1991 by regulation 1893/91) 
says nothing on market opening or how to award public service contracts. The 
development in several European countries during the 1990’s, with the introduction of 
competitively tendered rail services and the rise of international railway operators, has 
highlighted the need for a new regulation. For several years, such a regulation has been 
in the pipeline (see van de Velde, 2005b, for an extensive review). In 2005, the 
European Commission presented its third proposal. In this, it is established that all 
exclusive rights or compensations for any public service obligations must be established 
within a framework of a public service contract, defining clearly the obligations and 
geographical areas concerned and the parameters for calculating the compensation 
(European Commission, 2005). While previous proposals have been favouring almost 
compulsive competitive tendering for the award of public service contracts, the latest 
one takes a much less dogmatic view. There is now a possibility for authorities to 
provide public services by themselves, or to award them directly to an internal operator. 
Specifically, all regional and long-distance rail services are exempted from any 
obligation to be tendered, i.e. they may also be awarded directly. However, the 
possibility to award contracts directly comes with a limiting reciprocity rule, implying 
that the operator must not engage in other passenger transport activities outside the 
awarded territory.  
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In all, the current proposal for a new regulation on the award of public service 
contracts is not exactly in line with the efforts to further liberalise the European railway 
sector as proposed by the Commission’s third railway package. Existing public service 
contracts in one country may limit the possibility of cabotage, and, if used deliberately 
as a national policy, may even close off countries entirely from rail competition. It 
remains to bee seen if the reciprocity rule (that may dampen this effect) will really be 
enforced. Moreover, there seems to be an uncertainty about the exact border between 
the applicability of the new regulation versus the directives on public procurement, 
being dependant on whether certain procured services are to be viewed as “concessions” 
or “service contracts”. 
In yet another line of development, the European Commission has also taken a closer 
look at the development of different forms of Public-Private Partnerships in the member 
states. In 2004, a Green Paper was published, in order to stimulate a discussion on how 
to apply EU regulations to PPP projects, specifically concerning the choice of private 
partners (European Commission, 2004). One conclusion was that there is no proper 
definition of PPP at the EU level and no common legislatory framework, giving 
member states a rather large degree of freedom as long as the Treaty’s principles of 
transparency and non-discrimination are followed. The feedback following from the 
Green Paper will probably lead to suggestions from the European commission on new 
regulations, at least concerning the award of PPP concessions. 
 
 
The railway reforms of four countries 
 
Great Britain 
 
Origin and process. British Rail (BR) started to be criticised in the 1970’s for low 
productivity, inefficient management and ever increasing subsidies (Pryke & Dodgson, 
1975). In the early 1980’s BR experienced a severe financial crisis, forming the 
background to the work of the so-called Serpell committee. In its report, it was argued 
that major closures were necessary to reduce the need for subsidies (Serpell, 1982). 
Partly due to political concerns, BR was instead reorganised into several commercially 
oriented business sectors. This seems to have led to a remarkable improvement in BR’s 
productivity during the 1980’s. Nevertheless, from 1983 and onwards, several 
academics and right-wing thinkers argued for rail privatisation. In 1988, the politician 
John Redwood presented an overview of four alternative models for railway 
deregulation/privatisation being under consideration: 1) Privatisation of BR as a single 
unit, 2) Splitting of BR into several regional independent units, 3) Splitting of BR based 
upon its main business sectors, and 4) Separation of railway infrastructure from 
operations. Providing the advocates of rail privatisation with useful arguments, was the 
research on contestable markets, transaction cost economics, and the deregulation of the 
US railways sector. Other important influences were the EC directives aiming at 
opening up the railways to competing operators and Sweden’s vertical separation of 
infrastructure from operations and introduction of competitive tendering on regional 
lines (Alexandersson et al, 1997). 
When BR’s financial situation once again deteriorated in the early 1990’s, the search 
for an appropriate form of privatisation was intensified (Nash and Preston, 1993). In 
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July 1992, the Conservative Government presented a White Paper that set out six policy 
intentions to be achieved by April 1997 at the latest: 1) To sell British Rail Freight and 
Parcels to the private sector; 2) To establish a Franchising Authority and to franchise a 
substantial number of passenger services; 3) To restructure British Rail to own and 
operate track and infrastructure separately from operations; 4) To establish rights of 
access for new operators to the rail network; 5) To establish an independent Regulator; 
and 6) To provide opportunities for the sale or leasing of stations.  
The stated aims behind the railway privatisation reform was to make “better use of the 
railways, [to ensure] greater responsiveness to the customer, [to achieve] a higher 
quality of service and better value for money for the public who travel by rail” (OPRAF, 
1995, p. 29). The economic rationale was developed in more detail by the special 
adviser on rail privatisation, Sir Christopher Foster (Foster, 1994). He took the principal 
view that rail privatisation would achieve greater economic efficiency due to the 
superior incentives provided by the private sector. 
The White Paper was followed by a number of more specific documents from the 
Department of Transport and finally resulted in the passing of the Railways Act in 
November 1993. The Act laid the ground rules for the privatisation of British Rail, 
setting out the regulatory and statutory conditions under which this process, beginning 
in April 1994, could be undertaken. The company Railtrack was created by the Act, 
having as its key purpose to own, maintain and develop Britain’s mainline rail 
infrastructure. The decision to have a single rail infrastructure owner was based upon 
the belief that this part of the railway business bears the characteristics of a natural 
monopoly. In November 1994 the Government announced its decision to privatise 
Railtrack. The sale was completed in 1996 when the shares were floated on the stock 
market. 
The rolling stock was divided between three separate Rolling Stock Companies 
(ROSCOs), which were subsequently sold to the private sector in 1995-96. BR’s freight 
business was privatised and open access for freight operators was introduced. BR’s 
passenger rail operations were reorganised into 25 separate units, then transformed into 
Train Operating Companies (TOC). One or two at a time, these companies were 
subsequently franchised by means of a tendering procedure, with interested parties 
placing bids on the grounds of required subsidies. The tenders were organised by the 
newly created body Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF) and the process was 
completed in late March 1997. 
Including the sales of the supporting businesses, BR was divided into more than 80 
separate companies, the intention being to create competition in as many parts of the 
sector as possible (Nash, 1997). A number of new regulations were also designed with 
the purpose to encourage competition and guard the passengers’ interests concerning 
prices and coordination of rail services. The overall responsibility for making sure that 
the different actors followed these rules was placed in the hands of the Office of the Rail 
Regulator (ORR). 
The whole reform was completed in April 1997, not long before the Parliamentary 
Election in which the Conservative Party’s 18-year reign was brought to an end. The 
winning Labour Party decided not to reverse rail privatisation (as it had promised), but 
to expand investments and strengthen the regulatory body. OPRAF was transformed 
into the new Strategic Rail Authority, established in 2001. The new authority set out to 
re-franchise the operations of the TOCs and introduce longer agreements (20 years 
instead of 7 years) in return for TOC involvement in infrastructure investment. Railtrack 
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was perceived as lacking the ability to invest enough on its own, and the new idea was 
to finance major infrastructure improvements from a variety of sources (SRA grants and 
private capital), while Railtrack would buy the assets once they had been completed 
(Nash & Smith, 2006). However, for a number of reasons, the ambitious plans did not 
materialise. The Hatfield accident in the year 2000 set off a series of events that 
eventually lead to the collapse of Railtrack, being re-placed by a non-profit company, 
Network Rail. Also, several TOC’s turned out to have problems to fulfil their 
obligations (see further below). Therefore, several franchises were re-negotiated to 
temporary cost-plus contracts in order to later be re-franchised with the old contract 
length of 7 years. Infrastructure investment did increase, but the funds were directed to 
maintain and renew the existing network rather than to perform major upgrades. 
 
Experience to date. Although the response from the private sector to TOC 
franchising was lukewarm in the beginning, the original bidding process in 1995-97 was 
very competitive, with 5-10 serious bids for each franchise. Including the limited 
number of management-buy-outs, a total of 11 separate organisations entered the UK 
passenger train industry by means of winning franchises in tenders. Companies related 
to the bus industry (such as Stagecoach, National Express and First Bus) were very 
successful. National Express won more franchises (five) than anyone else, while French 
conglomerate Connex grabbed the biggest market share (16% of ticket revenues) 
(Alexandersson et al, 1997). 
Since privatisation started, there has been a substantial concentration in terms of the 
owners behind different franchisees; National Express is now the owner of 11 TOCs. 
When re-franchised, competition has generally continued to be strong. On one occasion 
a tender was stopped prematurely since too few (only two) operators were pre-qualified. 
(Nash & Smith, 2006). It has generally been difficult for the incumbents to defend their 
franchise in tenders. 
The TOCs were to be paid annual subsidies according to net cost agreements, 
typically to be reduced over the contract period. In some cases it was even envisaged 
that the TOCs would be able to make enough profits to be able to pay back money 
towards the end of the contract period. However, in several cases, these subsidy levels 
turned out not to be sufficient and in a couple of cases the winning bidders were clearly 
too optimistic. For this reason, some franchises had to be renegotiated or re-franchised 
early, for example leading to the exit of Connex altogether in 2003 (Nash & Smith, 
2006). 
After some initial reductions in the subsidies to train operators, they are now 
considerably higher than projected – almost back to the level at the beginning – and are 
expected to rise further when track access charges are increased to account for the 
revised costs of Network Rail. Since the collapse of Railtrack, there has actually been 
nothing less than a cost explosion in the British rail industry, affecting not only 
infrastructure but also train operations and rolling stock investments (Nash & Smith, 
2006). 
In terms of demand, the British experience is much more positive. It is clear that 
passenger demand and revenue have increased substantially since privatisation, 
although it is difficult to establish the relative importance of the possible multiple 
reasons behind this development. 
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Sweden 
 
Origin and process. Regulatory changes in the Swedish railway sector have often 
emanated from a wish to come to terms with the recurrent financial difficulties of 
Swedish State Railways (SJ). The Transport Policy Act of 1988, with its split of railway 
infrastructure from operations, is commonly considered the starting point for the 
transformation of the Swedish railway system, from a vertically and horizontally 
integrated monopoly to a market characterised by decentralisation and intra-modal 
competition. 
The Act had the objective to make the conditions for the railways more similar to 
those for the roads. The state took the full responsibility for railway infrastructure 
investments and maintenance by means of a new authority – Banverket, while SJ would 
be transformed into a train operating company, paying charges for using the tracks 
(based upon marginal costs for maintenance). The Act also marked a general policy step 
in the direction of extending the responsibility of the County Public Transport 
Authorities (CPTAs) into the unprofitable regional railway services. In return, the 
CPTAs were compensated by state subsidies equalling SJ’s operating deficits on these 
lines, and they also received the corresponding rolling stock. 
A deregulation of the railways in terms of increased intra-modal competition was not 
explicitly mentioned in the Act. Nevertheless, the vertical separation of infrastructure 
from operations, combined with the decentralised responsibility for regional railway 
services to regional authorities (along with the necessary money and rolling stock), 
made public procurement by competitive tendering of these lines possible. Some 
CPTAs had already tried tendering procedures for their bus services, as a result of 
previous reforms in that sector (Alexandersson, Hultén and Fölster, 1998). This made it 
natural to use competitive tendering also of regional railway lines. The outcome was the 
first new entrant, BK Tåg, in 1990. 
In the beginning of 1991, the Ministry of Transport expressed the view that more 
operators would stimulate the railway industry to make use of its resources in a more 
efficient way. After a shift in power in Parliament the same year, a new centre-right-
wing government declared its objective to open the railways to more competition. The 
first step was to subject more railway traffic to tendering. When SJ got rid of the 
responsibility for track infrastructure, it had been directed only to perform profitable 
train services under its own account. While large parts of the unprofitable services were 
run on the regional lines and therefore under the responsibility of the CPTAs, many 
services of the inter-regional main line network were also unprofitable. Since 1988, the 
state had been procuring these services by means of annual negotiations with SJ, but in 
1992 a competitive tendering process was used for the first time. 
In 1994, the first case of a BOT tender was completed, leading to a long-term contract 
to build and operate the new Arlanda Airport Link. The same year, a bill on a far-
reaching deregulation was passed in Parliament, but when the Social Democrats 
regained power in Parliament through the election later the same year, the deregulation 
of the railways was quickly postponed. Instead, a less radical reform was suggested, 
coming into effect in 1996. The functions of allocation of track capacity and train traffic 
control were transferred from SJ to Banverket, while other common facilities were to be 
available for other train operators under commercial but non-discriminating terms. The 
CPTAs’ rights were extended, making it easier for them to replace reductions in SJ’s 
supply of inter-regional trains with regional CPTA-managed services. Consequently, the 
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practice of competitive tendering became available for more parts of the railway 
network. For the freight services, open access on the whole network was introduced. 
A new Transport Policy Bill was passed in 1998. In an effort to achieve more equal 
terms for competing modes of transportation, in particular concerning freight, the track 
access fees were lowered. In order to make entry easier for freight operators competing 
with SJ, some fringe railway lines that had remained in SJ’s hands were transferred to 
Banverket. Moreover, a new national authority, Rikstrafiken, became responsible for 
competitive tendering of unprofitable inter-regional services (including all modes of 
public transportation). 
Following the inflow of new operators in 2000, a new Bill had the objective to 
facilitate for SJ to compete under the new circumstances and to ensure equal access to 
functions and services for all operators. SJ’s organisational structure as a business 
administration was therefore replaced in 2001 by several state-owned companies 
concentrating on specified parts of the railway businesses. The passenger division 
formed one company (SJ Ltd), the freight division another (Green Cargo), and so on for 
real estate, maintenance and other businesses. Two divisions, comprising cleaning 
services and computer information systems, respectively, were fully privatised. 
Since the Bill of 2000, it has often been suggested that the remaining monopoly of SJ 
Ltd concerning the profitable inter-regional lines should be abolished, possibly opening 
up for at least competitive tendering on these lines So far, the Social Democrat 
government has been unwilling to take this step, motivated by a perceived need for 
more time to evaluate the previous reforms, and the risk of creating new losses for SJ. 
The most recent reforms have focussed on modernising laws and regulations to achieve 
a regulatory framework in line with European Union directives and the recent railway 
packages. For example, a new Swedish Rail Agency was established in 2004. 
 
Experience to date. The past 15 years of railway reforms in Sweden have seen an 
important shift towards major investments in new and renewed infrastructure in a way 
that seemed impossible before the vertical separation of operations from rail 
infrastructure. The state has gone from spending 1 billion SEK annually on 
infrastructure investments in 1990 to about 3 billion SEK annually during the recession 
of the early 1990s, and now seems set to invest approximately 10 billion SEK (€1.1 
billion) per annum in the years to come. (All these figures are in nominal values). 
The introduction of competitive tendering of regional passenger railway lines in 1989 
immediately lead to the entry of BK Tåg in 1990. For a couple of years this remained 
the only new entrant and true competitor to SJ. It was not until 1995 that another small 
operator entered this part of the market. In the market for inter-regional services, the 
break-through for competing operators did not happen until the year 2000, after 
transparency had gradually been improved as more and more functions and resources 
had been handed over from SJ to Banverket. Currently, about 20 train operating 
companies use the Swedish state’s rail infrastructure, most of them being very small. On 
the passenger side, the state-owned company SJ Ltd is still the dominant operator, but 
private firms like Connex, Keolis and Tågkompaniet are important competitors. Arriva 
is set to enter in 2007. In terms of passenger kilometres, SJ Ltd had a 74% share of all 
railway services in 2004, with an 88% share of the long-distance (more than 100 
kilometres) and a 54% share of the short-distance (less than 100 kilometres) railway 
services. Green Cargo, formed out of the former freight division of SJ, is the largest rail 
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freight operator, with a 74% market share in rail freight transportation in 2004 
(Banverket, 2005). 
Data on subsidy reductions caused by the tenders carried out by the CPTAs is 
somewhat scarce, partly due to difficulties when comparing subsidy levels under 
different conditions. Typically, there have been subsidy reductions in the magnitude of 
20% in the first round of tendering. For the services procured by the state, substantial 
reductions were accomplished during the first two years of tendering, despite the lack of 
actual new entry. After that a period of tenders implying stable subsidies followed. 
When several new firms finally were able to win these tenders in 1999, additional large 
subsidy reductions (28%) were achieved (Alexandersson et al, 2000). 
The decentralised responsibility of regional passenger rail lines, making them 
organised by the same authorities as are responsible for public bus services, appears to 
have brought about better co-ordination of regional train services with bus services. 
Combined with the high level of ambition among many CPTAs to develop the regional 
train services, this has probably played an important role in the positive development of 
railway travel. Passenger train transportation has since 1995 experienced a stronger 
growth than all other modes in terms of passenger kilometres. Behind this increase of 
32%, we find that the growth in short-distance regional transportation has been 
particularly strong (up more than 70%), while long-distance travelling (more than 100 
km) increased by 15% (SIKA, 2005). 
In conjunction with the corporatisation of SJ and the creation of the separate 
maintenance company Euromaint, it became evident that maintenance and security 
check-ups of had been lagging behind in the integrated firm. The new organisation with 
separate entities facilitated a rapid solution to these safety issues before any fatal 
accident had occurred. 
The number of bidders taking part in Swedish passenger rail tenders has been rather 
low. On average, the CPTAs’ tenders for gross cost contracts – in which the operator 
bears no ticket revenue risk – have attracted more bidders (2-3) than the state’s tenders 
for net cost contracts (1-2) – where the operator gets the revenues from fares. A 
recurrent problem has also been the non-fulfilment of tendered contracts. In all these 
cases the railway passengers have been put at a disadvantage by disruption of the 
services, fewer trains or trains being replaced by buses.  
 Contract costs show signs of being on the increase. Both big and small firms have 
placed unreasonably low bids that have resulted in economic problems for the firms. 
Citypendeln (Keolis) had enormous problems in early 2000 when taking over the 
commuter services in Stockholm from SJ. In early 2005, Connex aborted some train 
departures of its railway services to northern Sweden after re-negotiations with 
Rikstrafiken. Loss-creating contracts have ultimately lead to bankruptcies on two 
occasions in Sweden – Sydvästen in the year 2000 and BK Tåg in 2005. After having 
placed several too optimistic bids SJ Ltd came close to bankruptcy in 2002-2003, and 
was saved mainly because the state stepped in with an additional capital of €200 
million. Litigation is also increasingly being used. In the year 2000, SJ was sentenced to 
a fine and paid substantial damages to BK Tåg after losing a court case on under-pricing 
fought against the Swedish Competition Authority. In 2002 Tågkompaniet 
unsuccessfully tried to stop Connex from taking over the trains to northern Sweden. 
Rikstrafiken was drawn into a potentially costly law-suit that it avoided by admitting to 
have made errors in the procurement of the services. In 2006 many different firms 
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unsuccessfully tried to stop the winning bid for the commuter trains in the Stockholm 
region.  
 
Germany 
 
Origin and process. Beginning in the 1960’s, rising deficits lead to several attempts 
to reform the German railway sector. Most of these attempts failed, due to opposing 
interest groups such as the states and the employees, and the lack of a broad political 
consensus on suggested reforms. The deficits of the national railway operator in 
Western Germany, Deutsche Bundesbahn (DB), increasingly became a major fiscal 
burden for the federal budget, reaching a record level of about €7.5 billion in 1990. 
From 1960 to 1990, the rail’s market share compared to road transportation also 
declined from 37.3% to 20.6%. When the re-unification of Germany in 1990 also added 
the problems of Deutche Reichbahn (DR), it became clear that fundamental reforms 
were absolutely necessary in the German railway sector (Kirchner, 2005). 
Three consecutive Commissions (of 1989, 1990 and 1991) suggested the 
restructuring, liberalisation and deregulation of the German railway sector, although 
differing in their view on how far liberalisation and deregulation should go (Lehmann, 
1999). The Government Commission of 1991 proposed a far-reaching structural reform 
by means of the creation of a new holding company that initially would be owned by the 
federal government but later on privatised (limited to the freight traffic and passenger 
divisions only). The debts should be transferred to an external institution, and in order to 
reduce the burden of the many privileged civil servants of the workforce, an external 
institution would take over the staff. The new holding company would then be able to 
renegotiate terms and re-hire each employee individually, paying market salaries rather 
than civil servants’ salaries. The services on the unprofitable lines were to be made the 
responsibility of the states (in a step towards regionalisation), albeit following 
negotiations on necessary subsidies taken from the federal budget. In order to stimulate 
intra-modal competition, the Commission also proposed non-discriminatory open access 
for other operators to the entire network of the new holding company (Kirchner, 2005). 
The suggested reforms were put forward as national solutions to national problems, 
but were also influenced by the current work on the European Community level which 
led to the Council Directive 91/440/EEC. 
In 1993, the two national operators DB and DR were merged into BEV, forming a 
special federal government railway asset. Deutsche Bahn AG (DB AG) was then spun 
off from BEV’s assets, forming a new private stock corporation in January 1994, with 
subsidiaries for long-distance passenger services, regional passenger services, freight 
services, railway services and the track network. Cross-subsidisation between these 
entities was prohibited. DB AG was supposed to operate on commercial terms with full 
responsibility for costs and revenues, and the separation into different units was 
supposed to improve transparency and enable the units to work as profit-centres close to 
the market (Lehmann, 1999). The separation of long-distance from regional passenger 
services was linked to the regionalisation (see below) and a fear among the states that 
DB AG would otherwise cross-subsidise the long-distance services at the expense of 
regional services. 
DB AG was kept under federal government ownership, but changes in the constitution 
were made to make it possible to sell stocks to the public later on, with the exception of 
such railway undertakings that functioned as infrastructure managers. 
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Open access on non-discriminatory terms was introduced for all German railway 
companies and also for EU member states companies. A new federal regulatory body 
was set up. BEV relieved the former national operators of debts and other financial 
burdens, amounting to a massive €63 billion (Kirchner, 2005). 
Another important element of the reforms was the regionalisation of regional 
passenger services. In 1996, the German states (Länder) became responsible for the 
regional passenger services, receiving subsidies from the federal government to keep 
socially important public train services. Some states have chosen to put these services 
out to tendering, while others have chosen only to close contracts with DB Regio (a 
subsidiary to Deutsche Bahn AG) (Kirchner, 2005). 
In 1999, the reform process took another step, transforming the five operative 
divisions of Deutsche Bahn AG (now a holding company) into independent 
corporations. One of these is DB Netz, the track infrastructure provider. This model of 
“less than complete” vertical separation of infrastructure from operations has been the 
subject of much debate and criticism, since some politicians and researchers have 
claimed that it is not sufficient to exclude discrimination of other operators (despite 
additional measures such as a regulatory body and specific regulations). Others have 
defended the model as a way to keep some of the benefits of integration, such as lower 
transaction costs and possibilities for track-wheel innovations (Lehmann, 1999; 
Kirchner, 2005). 
 
Experience to date. Initial regional tenders performed by the states attracted only a 
few bidders. Rather commonly, local publicly-owned organisations or DB Regio won 
the tenders. For several years no new company entered the long-distance passenger 
market, despite the open access (Lehmann, 1999).  
In recent years, the number of new entrants has increased. A total of 286 railway 
companies are now present, most of them operating in the freight sector. Although it is 
growing, the combined market share of the new operators is still low: about 5% in rail 
passenger transportation and about 7% in freight transportation (Kirchner, 2005). In 
particular, French firms (such as Connex, Transdev and Keolis) are very active in 
Germany (Deutsche Bahn, 2004). In 2004, British Arriva entered in a major way by 
means of several acquisitions (Deutsche Bahn, 2005). 
Between 2001 and 2004, a total of 39 tenders were carried out, with contract lengths 
from 3-15 years (Brenck et al, 2005). Although contracts are commonly used in local 
and regional passenger services, they are not always awarded through tendering, and 
there are still some obstacles related to access pricing, rolling stock approval, 
administration and information (Kirchner, 2005). The practice of direct awards in some 
areas, rather than tendering, is being challenged on the EU level. There have been cases 
of very low bids in regional tenders, and also too optimistic efforts to start new long-
distance passenger services, leading to the exit of some firms (Deutsche Bahn, 2004, 
2005). 
Passenger rail services have increased their market shares between 1993 and 2003 
compared to other modes, while the share of freight services by rail has decreased 
during the same period (although it has been rising in recent years) (Kirchner, 2005). 
There is some research indicating that competitively procured lines grow faster (in 
terms of frequency) than other lines (Lalive and Schmutzler, 2005).  
The heavy investments needed in Eastern Germany have had a large impact on public 
spending on infrastructure and rolling stock. Consequently, the federal expenditures 
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since the beginning of the reform process have been very large, but nevertheless lower 
than expected, and substantially lower than what was to be expected if no reforms had 
been made (Kirchner, 2005). 
 
 
The Netherlands 
 
Origin and process. The railway reform process in the Netherlands was initiated in 
1991 by means of the recommendations of a committee appointed by the Ministry of 
Transport, stating the need to make the national railway company Nederlandse 
Spoorwegen (NS) independent of subsidies. The first actual reforms were implemented 
in 1995 with the reorganisation of NS into several subsidiaries and subdivisions. The 
subsidiary NS Groep included those divisions that were supposed to work under market 
principles (including passenger services, stations, and real estate) and was supposed to 
become privatised in the future. Infrastructure and related issues were to be handled by 
three task organisations within NS, although directly financed by the Ministry. The 
reforms of 1995 included an agreement to set the infrastructure access charges to zero 
until the year 2000, in return for a reduction in state subsidies from €130 million in 
1995 to zero in 2000 for a defined network that was supposed to be able to cover its 
operational costs (excluding infrastructure costs). A special contract agreement on 
continuous subsidies was reached for a set of other loss-making lines with socially 
desirable services (van de Velde, 2005a). 
The original committee had not proposed the introduction of competition in passenger 
services. Nevertheless, the reforms of 1995 made competition a possible option. An 
experiment with on-the-track competition came into effect after a private company had 
asked for permission to add services on some lines already operated by NS. The 
initiative lasted from 1996 to 1999 (when the new entrant went bankrupt). During this 
period, the Government also actively sought information and experiences from the 
introduction of railway competition in other countries.  
In 1999, a new administration issued a policy document that broke both with the on-
the-track experiment and a British franchising model for the national network as had 
been suggested by the former liberal administration. Instead, it suggested that NS should 
be given a 10-year concession to run the profitable part of the national network in 
accordance with a performance contract, including a number of obligations, incentives 
and targets. On the other hand, loss making regional services would increasingly be 
subjected to competitive tendering. While the new performance contract became 
delayed several years due to political opposition and NS’ problems to fulfil the targets 
in a transitional contract, a new transport law came into effect in 2000. It introduced the 
principle of “authority initiative” rather than “market initiative”. Under this principle, 
competitive tendering was to be used in all public transportation, mainly affecting the 
regional bus and train services. New regional transport authorities were created, and 
some tenders of regional lines were performed, but more commonly the threat of 
tendering was used in order to stimulate the creation of integrated bus and rail networks. 
A special government approach was used in 2001 for the new high-speed line 
Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Brussels, with a tender for a concession to run the services for 
15 years, while the construction and maintenance of the infrastructure was in part 
organised as a Public-Private Partnership with a contract length of 30 years (van de 
Velde, 2005a). 
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In 2002 a full separation of infrastructure management from operations was 
implemented and a new state-owned rail infrastructure organisation, ProRail, was 
created in 2003. A new monitoring and regulatory body, Office of Transport 
Regulation, was established in 2004 as a part of the National Competition Authority. 
In 2004, the 10-year concession and performance contract for the trunk rail network 
was finally settled, coming into effect in 2005. NS was granted this exclusive 
concession, which includes a number of performance clauses on gradual improvements 
but no payment from the state to NS. An evaluation in 2008 may result in a competitive 
tender, but NS is no longer set to be privatised. This concession was only one part of a 
new long-term regime for the railways, aiming at achieving a reliable railway system. 
Another 10-year concession was granted to ProRail for the management of 
infrastructure. Also, several measures were taken to improve cooperation and 
coordination between infrastructure management and the train operators. 
In December 2005, the central government decided that the process of 
decentralisation and competitive tendering of regional lines will continue, in order to 
include more lines (van Dijk, 2006). 
 
Experience to date. The introduction of contract agreements and (threats of) 
competitive tendering generally seems to have put a pressure on NS to keep costs down, 
thereby making reduced subsidies possible. For example, the initial contract for the non-
profitable lines reduced subsidies by 50%. However, NS has had a hard time reaching 
the envisioned targets and it seems as if excessive focus on rationalisations lead to a low 
reliability of both infrastructure and vehicles. Political uncertainty on how to proceed 
with reforms (regarding e.g. competition and privatisation), lack of governmental 
supervision of the task organisations, and too much focus on new infrastructure 
investment projects rather than infrastructure maintenance, created an unstable 
environment for the railways. This may have contributed to the reduced performance 
and a related drop in patronage after 2000 back to 1995 levels (van de Velde, 2005a). 
Competitive tendering has gradually been tried by more and more regional authorities, 
but has so far only affected about 6% of the Dutch network (van Dijk, 2006). Partly 
depending upon the conditions in the tenders, the resulting contracts have implied either 
a gain in quality, quantity or rolling stock, or substantially lower subsidies (20-50%) for 
the same level of supply. This may be compared to some directly awarded contracts that 
have only implied gains up to 10%. Contract periods have varied from 5-6 years to 10-
15 years (the latter involving investments in new rolling stock). 
A couple of new entrants have appeared. Apart from the case of Lovers Rail entering 
in on-the-track competition with NS, entry has occurred through the competitive 
tendering of regional lines, with companies like Arriva and Connexxion taking the lead 
(van Dijk, 2006). In addition to this, the demand for coordinated bus and railway 
services has initiated the creation of some new constellations of firms of different 
origin, such as NS and Arriva and NS and Keolis. The brief history of Lovers Rail 
showed that even if the new operator did not actually enter into some parts of the 
network that it had been granted permission to, the mere threat made NS expand and 
improve its services in these areas. The bankruptcy of Lovers Rail was ultimately 
caused by a lack of integrated ticketing with NS (van de Velde, 2005a). 
The punctuality problem in the early 2000’s caused something of a crisis in the 
Netherlands. When NS failed to meet the contracted performance target of 88%, the 
Ministry in mid 2001 initially reduced the required level to 80%. Later the same year, 
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when it became clear that NS would only reach 79.9%, the complete Board and two 
managers had to resign, a rather unique event from a European railway sector 
perspective. 
 
 
Analysis 
The regulatory reforms of the railway sector in the EU member states have been 
driven by different types of economic, institutional and legal concerns. We will start this 
section by examining these differences in more detail. 
In Great Britain, the pursuit of a conservative market liberalisation agenda was an 
important initiator, although the problems of British Rail also played a role. In the 
design of the reforms, two theoretical approaches seem to have dominated. First and 
foremost, the belief that private ownership and management is superior to public 
ownership, since private firms will make sure that the needs of the market will be met in 
order to reach maximum profits. For example, this explains why even the track 
infrastructure was privatised. Second, the belief that transaction costs were generally 
low, clearly lead to a very large degree of both vertical and horizontal disintegration. It 
also influenced the limits put on TOC mergers, as it was apparently believed that 
keeping the number of competitors high would benefit the market more than any 
possible gains from re-integrated services (although TOC ownership was much less 
restricted). 
In Sweden, the primary driver for reforms has been the recurrent problems to make SJ 
profitable. This has generated reforms for several decades. Since SJ’s problems have 
often been viewed as linked to heavy competition from other modes of transportation, 
several reforms have been designed to improve the possibilities for railways to meet 
inter-modal competition. This was one of the most important aims with the vertical 
separation of infrastructure from operations in 1988, making the conditions more similar 
to those for the roads. The importance of keeping unprofitable lines running for social 
concerns has been another important factor. Coupled with the idea to decentralise the 
responsibility to the level where this mattered most (the regional level) this became the 
starting point for the introduction of contracts and tendering in the Swedish railway 
sector. It was not foreseen that this would lead to intra-modal competition, but once it 
did with positive results, it became a part of the political agenda and competitive 
tendering spread to more and more railway lines. The process of reforms in Sweden has 
been incremental compared to the more radical approach of Great Britain. A more 
radical approach was tried once (in 1994) but was reversed by a new political majority 
even before it was implemented. Although some actors have advocated more general 
steps towards deregulation and privatisation, the impact upon overall railway 
transportation policy has been rather limited. One exception is the deregulation of 
freight services in 1996. The only instant when private sector capital has actively been 
sought after was in the BOT tender of the new Arlanda airport link. 
In Germany, reforms were clearly borne out of necessity, following many years of 
financial problems and deteriorated market shares, culminating at the time of the 
German re-unification in 1990. The reforms focussed upon relieving the railways of 
debts and costly rules of employment to make a fresh start, initially with the intention of 
a future privatisation of passenger and freight operations. Regionalisation opened up for 
competitive tendering of local lines and networks, but several regions have chosen not 
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to make use of tendering. Overall, there has not been a general policy to promote 
efficiency by means of intra-modal competition, although the introduction of open 
access for long-distance passenger services was a step in that direction. To make the 
railways more efficient to meet inter-modal competition seems to have been more 
important. Also, Germany has been very reluctant to go all the way in terms of vertical 
separation of infrastructure from operations, based upon a firm belief in the benefits of 
integration. 
The Netherlands has spent several years seeking for appropriate reforms to 
implement, that to a considerable extent draw on the experiences of other countries. The 
policy has varied over time depending upon circumstances, also making room for 
experiments with on-the-track competition. Initially, the growing subsidies played an 
important role as initiator to the reforms, and privatisation of NS operations was 
envisaged as preferable and possible. Regionalisation has been carried out, while the 
approach to competitive tendering at first was ambivalent but now looks set to continue. 
A common principle has been to use the threat of competitive tendering as a way to 
promote performance improvement. Railway performance, seen from the end user 
perspective, has been very important (more so than financial concerns). Much effort has 
been put into the creation of contracts focussing on performance measures and targets. 
Recurrent failures to meet performance have also created situations of crisis. 
Privatisation of NS passenger operations is no longer seen as an option – following the 
mixed British experience and experiences from other sectors. 
The parallel development of a common European Union policy for the railways has 
played a role in the reform process of individual member states, but the extent and 
impact vary among countries. The vertical separation in Sweden preceded the EU 
initiative (Sweden did not join the EU until seven years after this reform). It may 
actually be argued that EU policy to some extent was influenced by Sweden’s reforms. 
During the second half of the 1990’s, Sweden was mostly prompted to implement minor 
revisions in the regulatory framework in order to comply with EU policy. In recent 
years, the influence has become bigger and the impact will most certainly be 
pronounced if the liberalisation of international passenger services actually happens in 
2010. In Great Britain, EU policy may not have played a role as an initiator, but 
possibly influenced the design (vertical separation). The radical reforms of Great 
Britain, and their effects, have been a source of inspiration in most European Union 
member states, but sometimes also used as warning examples in order to oppose 
reforms where privatisation would be an important element. In Germany and the 
Netherlands, EU policy has played a role for the timing of reforms, but both countries 
have sought to find national solutions that avoided a full separation of infrastructure 
from operations. In the Netherlands, this is no longer the case, while Germany has 
persisted in keeping some vertical integration. 
It is evident that the different tendering regimes suffer from different types of 
problems. In the Swedish tenders there have often been very few competing firms. In 
Britain the relatively long time span of the first round of franchised contracts resulted in 
difficulties in making correct estimates of the future behaviour of the markets and 
market actors. In Germany, tenders are mostly used in the local and regional markets 
and they have not significantly helped to diminish the deficits in the railway sector. The 
Netherlands has recently started with competitive tenders and their effects are so far 
rather limited, but problems related to NS performance have been exposed. Sweden, 
Germany and Great Britain have all experienced problems with winning bids that turned 
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out to be too optimistic, leading to service interruptions, re-negotiations and 
bankruptcies. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
The introduction of competitive tendering has been theoretically motivated by a 
general belief that the private sector is more effective than the public sector and that 
competition fosters efficiency. Advocates of PPP solutions typically state that long-term 
private sector involvement like BOT arrangements offer more advantages than e.g. 
short-term service or management contracts. Their basic argument is that the bundling 
of activities in a BOT enables a private firm or consortium to optimise the total project. 
This is not really reflected in the policies and actions of the European Union member 
states and public authorities. In the case of passenger railway services, it is evident that 
they have been more interested in using competition either as a threat or as a mean to 
increase efficiency in the railway market. The number of BOT projects is very limited. 
Before the reforms and deregulation of the European railway services took off, there 
was a widespread belief in important economies of scale in railway operations. After 
more than fifteen years of competitive tendering, we can note that more and more public 
agencies purchasing railway passenger services act as if the gains from competition are 
greater than any potential resulting losses of economies of scale, scope or density. There 
may be multiple reasons for this, such as agency costs and problems for the political 
system to supervise the activities of a monopoly, but also a belief that competition 
between several firms will still allow for economies of scale to be exploited where 
appropriate. 
A possible increase in transaction costs has not been seen as a major obstacle for the 
introduction of competitive tendering or the vertical separation of the former national 
railway monopolies. Generally speaking, there has been a clear trend towards the use of 
more and more contracts to formalise the obligations of different actors in the European 
railway industry. However, recent research suggests that transaction costs may be 
higher than expected. The evidence is both theoretical and empirical. Asset specificity 
may have produced problems when designing the contracts in the British case. A lack of 
bidders (the small numbers problem) has been apparent in some countries. Contract 
costs seem to be inherent in the competitive tenders, in auctions as well as beauty 
contests. Many winning bids have been too optimistic, the combined evaluation of price 
and quality has often resulted in legal processes, and renegotiations have turned out to 
be necessary when costs and revenues didn’t develop according to plans. 
We see at least two major possibilities for future empirical research. Firstly, a 
comparative European study directed towards measuring the effects of competitive 
tendering and testing the relative contribution of different factors, such as network size, 
number of bidders, contract length, how many times the services have been tendered, 
type of contract (net or gross cost), upstream competitive markets or vertical monopoly, 
and so on. Secondly, research projects including both statistical and qualitative data, 
comparing railway systems using competitive tendering to railway systems using either 
negotiated contracts or a monopoly regime. Such a study could shed some light on the 
relative merits of the different regimes after nearly two decades of experimentation with 
railway deregulation in Europe. 
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